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The Anatomy of a Clinical Law Course 
James ]. Whitet 
I. INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL COURSE DESCRIPTION 
Since the summer of 1965 when the Michigan Supreme Court first 
authorized law student practice on the behalf of indigent persons, 
students at the University of Michigan Law School have been engaged 
in extensive practice on behalf of indigent persons in Washtenaw 
County. Between 75 and 125 second and third year students at the 
University of Michigan Law School each semester have worked at the 
Washtenaw County Legal Aid Clinic under the direction of the OEO 
Staff attorneys. Students receive neither credit nor pay for such work 
and their activities are not directly supervised by the faculty. That 
volunteer experience has become an important and continuing part 
of the extracurricular legal education at Michigan and an analysis 
of the strengths and weaknesses of that experience would undoubt-
edly be illuminating. However, I intend to devote the pages that follow 
not to the Michigan volunteer experience but to a description of a 
credit course which I conducted at the Washtenaw County Legal 
Aid Clinic in the summer of 1969. For want of a better title we called 
the course "Clinical Law." 
In the spring of 1969 the faculty of the University of Michigan 
Law School approved "Clinical Law" on an experimental basis. I 
had asked the faculty to authorize a course for six or eight semester 
cred~t hours but the faculty consensus was that four hours was suffi-
cient time to be devoted to such an experimental course. On the 
optimistic assumption that a student gives forty hours of his time for 
each semester credit hour that he receives, we concluded that a student 
should perform 160 hours of work in the clinic to receive his four 
credit hours. 
We offered the course as part of the eight-week summer term in 
1969 at the University of Michigan Law School. The course was 
open to any student who had completed his freshmen year and ten 
students were chosen by lot from the 25 who applied for admission 
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to the course. As part of his 160 hour work commitment, the student 
was required to attend a series of evening seminars and several meet-
ings with county officials. Except for an occasional appearance under 
the supervision of one of the staff attorneys at the Washtenaw County 
Legal Aid Clinic, all of the students' clinical work was done under 
my supervision and, with a few exceptions, I was the counsel of record 
in the cases handled by the students in the course. 
All of the cases for the class work came from the case load at the 
Washtenaw County Legal Aid Clinic, an OEO supported neighbor-
hood legal office located in downtown Ann Arbor approximately 
three quarters of a mile from the law school and a block from the 
local courts. At the outset of the course I assigned each student six 
divorce cases, a bankruptcy case, and at least one "miscellaneous" 
case. The choice of several divorce cases as a course starting point 
served two purposes. It gave the students interviewing practice under 
supervision, and it gave them an opportunity to appear in court and 
examine a witness in a noncontested matter. Other cases were chosen 
simply because they were available in sufficient numbers or, in some 
instances, because they offered unusual and interesting issues. 
During the eight weeks we held five evening seminars. The first 
dealt with the interviewing process and was conducted by Dr. Moham-
med Shafii, a psychiatrist on the medical school faculty who had 
taught in the law school previously. We held that seminar in the 
second week of the course after each student had had at least one 
interview at the clinic. The student reaction to the seminar was 
mixed however. I think it likely that some of the students learned 
a substantial amount, but that we could have done a much more 
effective job had we devoted several seminars to interviewing. In the 
second seminar we discussed a particularly complex housing case 
on which five of the students were working. (The locus for that sem-
inar, a local beer hall, detracted substantially from the amount and 
type of work which we accomplished.) At the third seminar two 
students presented a discussion of the Michigan landlord-tenant law. 
A local judge who has had more experience with the 1968 Mich. 
"Tenant's Rights" law than any other judge in the state (students 
at the University of Michigan have been conducting a rent strike 
during the past year), participated in that seminar and offered his 
interpretation and analysis of the Michigan law. The fourth and 
fifth seminars were devoted to the discussion of the jury decision 
process and of jury selection respectively. In the fourth seminar we 
invited two jurors who had recently served on cases in which students 
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in the course had been involved to talk about their experiences as 
jurors. In the fifth seminar an able Ann Arbor practitioner and a 
professor in the political science department who is studying juror 
selection by lawyers spoke on the art of juror selection. 
During the course each student submitted a daily time sheet. These 
time sheets show the amount of time put in on each task for each 
client everyday during the course and one can distill a great deal of 
data on the student experience from them. When the course is com-
pleted, nearly all of the students will have devoted in excess of 200 
hours to course work. This work will have been performed on behalf 
of 97 clients, 32 of whom have received more than ten hours of stu-
dent labor at this writing and several of whom have received more 
than 100 hours of student work. It developed that the course ran 
heavily to litigation and by the time the work is completed in late 
1969, the students in the course will have conducted at least five jury 
trials, four nonjury trials, and half a dozen contested motions. This 
is all in addition to the 15 or 20 noncontested divorce cases and two 
dozen noncontested divorce motions. The chart which follows is a 
composite of the students' work; it gives a general picture of the 
distribution of their time among the various areas into which the 
course cases fell. 
Land- Bank-
Name Divorce lord ruptcy 
Action Tenant Action 
Antola 44V2 33 5V2 
Baumann 59;4 54% 10V2 
Clark 25% 105 15 
Cook 5214 9 10~ 
Huck 22V2 100V2 12V2 
Invin 28V2 19 l4 
McMahon 84 20 10% 
Padgett 58 6o/.I 2!-{ 
Rockman 30V2 52V2 4V2 
Sutton 59~ 2V2 1 
TOTAL 465 403 73 
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The chart gives some interesting indications about how our plans 
did and did not work out. Note that approximately one quarter of 
the total student work was devoted to divorce. This includes time 
spent interviewing the client, discussing the interview with the teach-
er, preparing pleadings and appearing in court. It developed that 
many of the divorces were in a dormant state and could not be com-
pleted until after the course was over; in others the clients drifted 
away or chose to drop the divorce proceedings. Note also the large 
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amount of time spent on criminal cases. Although we did not have 
sufficient criminal cases available at the outset to assign one to each 
student, eight out of the ten students eventually took part in a criminal 
or quasi criminal case. These ranged from misdemeanors (contribut-
ing to the delinquency of a minor; contention in the street) through 
traffic cases (wrong right turn) to the defense of a paternity suit 
brought by the state on behalf of an ADC mother. Because they 
presented truly adversary proceedings, dealt with something of obvious 
importance to the client, and moved along with much greater speed 
than the usual civil case, criminal cases attracted a substantial amount 
of the students' time and interest. The chart also shows that we 
landed several sizeable landlord-tenant cases but that we had insuffi-
cient bankruptcy and welfare cases to give each student an adequate 
exposure to those areas. Only one welfare case, (and it an atypical 
one dealing with social security benefits to the aged) and only three 
bankruptcy cases developed fully during the course. 
As cases were settled or became dormant, we attempted to assign 
new cases to students with an eye toward giving them an experience 
in all of the areas in which we had cases available. The chart shows 
that we were not entirely successful in this endeavor and it should 
be equally obvious that except for the initial divorce exposure we 
were quite unable to give cases to the students in any planned order. 
In a typical case the student would not conduct the initial inter-
view, for we would get the case from the clinic director only after 
it had been accepted and the clinic director and I had determined 
that it was a case suited to the course needs. Upon receiving a case 
the student lawyer would contact the client, conduct a second inter-
view and then commence the appropriate action. He was free to talk 
with me when he thought that necessary and commonly we would 
have a discussion at the outset to determine the appropriate action. 
If that action involved the drafting of an answer, complaint, or any 
other document, I would go over a draft of that document with him 
and both of us would sign it. 
In the courtroom the students conducted the examination of all 
of the witnesses in noncontested divorce cases and, with one excep-
tion, made all of the arguments in both the contested and noncon-
tested motions. In jury trials our general pattern was to permit the 
student to make the opening statement and to conduct the direct 
examination of our witnesses; I would then conduct the cross-exam-
ination of the opposing party's witnesses and make the closing argu-
ment. 
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II. FIVE SAMPLE CASES 
The flavor of the course work is perhaps best conveyed not by 
charts and totals, but by a study of several examples of student cases. 
Below is a description of five of the cases which students handled 
during the summer course. These five cases are not representative 
of all of the cases which students handled in the course, but an 
examination of the students' work on these cases will give an accurate 
and full-bodied taste of the students' work in the course. 
Landlord Tenant-Ruth Layman 
Mrs. Layman first came to the clinic to seek a divorce. While the 
divorce was pending, her landlady served her with a "seven-day no-
tice" to quit, the first step in the Michigan eviction procedure. Mrs. 
Layman reported to her student lawyer that the premises were de-
fective in a number of ways and specifically that the stairs were 
rickety, several light fixtures were inoperative, that the sink had not 
worked since she had come to the apartment and that the roof leaked. 
She stated that the landlady had promised to repair the premises, 
and that she (Mrs. Layman) had failed to pay the previous month's 
rent. The student lawyer determined that the appropriate action 
would be to file an answer to the complaint which followed the 
"seven-day notice" and to counterclaim for a reduction in rent on 
the theory that the landlady had committed a substantial breach of 
her obligations under the oral lease and under Michigan law. In 
addition he determined that it would be appropriate to ask for a 
jury trial both because a jury would be more favorably disposed to 
our arguments than a judge would and because the request for a 
jury would give us breathing space of at least ten days in which to 
draft an answer, a counterclaim and to prepare for trial. The case, 
originally set for trial on July 16, was first adjourned to August 6 
on the judge's motion and then to August 13. In preparation for the 
trial the student lawyers interviewed a building inspector in Ypsilanti, 
a health inspector in Ann Arbor, two of Mrs. Layman's friends and 
examined and took pictures of the premises. 
In mid J une, shortly after the action was commenced, the landlady 
locked Mrs. Layman out of the apartment by nailing the door shut. 
Shortly after Mrs. Layman gained readmittance with the aid of a sher-
iff's deputy, she fell on a broken tread on the outside stairs and had 
to go to the hospital to have her leg treated. Accordingly the student 
lawyers filed additional counterclaims for the damages resulting from 
the lockout and for the damages resulting from injuries suffered in 
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the fall. The second counterclaim brought a Detroit law firm into the 
case to represent the liability carrier of the landlady. During the first 
week in August the student lawyers subpoenaed the Ann Arbor health 
inspector and two friends of Mrs. Layman to insure that they would 
be present in court on August 6. On August 6 all appeared in court 
bright eyed and bushy tailed only to find that the court had put the 
case over for another week to August 13 but had failed to get word 
to us. On August 13 the student lawyers again appeared with their 
witnesses (and with a supervising counsel from the clinic) only to find 
that the attorney for the plaintiff was not there. The court dismissed the 
case. 
Subsequently the court permitted plaintiff to file a new suit in which 
she claimed rent and other damages identical to those claimed in the 
first case. The court denied our motion to strike all claims for rent 
and damages which had accrued prior to August 13 and set the case 
for trial on August 27. 
On August 27 the case was tried before a jury of six in the 14th Ju-
dicial District Court in Ypsilanti. One student lawyer made the open-
ing statement and conducted the direct examination of two of the 
five defense witnesses. The other student conducted the examination 
of the remaining three defense witnesses. The testimony both as to 
who caused the dilapidation of the premises and who was obliged to 
repair was sharply conflicting. The jury returned a verdict for eviction 
and for $240 of back rent. (The $240 represented reduction of approx-
imately $140 from the amount oLrent which plaintiff claimed and 
which would have been due at the agreed rental rate of $120 per 
month.) 
Default Divorce-Linda Jefferson 
Sometime late in 1968 Mrs. Linda Jefferson had come to the Legal 
Aid Clinic to seek a divorce from her husband. A student lawyer had 
commenced the divorce by filing a complaint and by June 7, 1969, 
the compulsory six-month waiting period from the filing of the com-
plaint to the taking of a default had passed and the case was ready for 
a default to be taken. The student lawyer's work to procure a divorce 
consisted of drafting a variety of papers including a judgment of di-
vorce, a "military affidavit," a motion for default and a motion for 
waiver of fees together with an affidavit of indigency. The student 
had also to interview the client to determine what facts needed to be 
included in the judgment and to go over the questions and answers 
necessary to procure a judgment. Finally, the student conducted the 
examination of the client in court to procure the divorce. 
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Contributing To The Delinquency Of A Minor- Larry Gates 
Gates was an unfortunate 17 year old who was charged with con-
tributing to the delinquency of three 14 year old girls who had run 
away from school and stayed away from home for two nights. The 
Michigan statute provides that one is guilty of "contributing" if he 
does acts which tend to bring another within the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court. The defendant admitted that he had been in a car with 
the girls, that he knew they had stayed at a motel in Ypsilanti over-
night, and that he had failed to tell their fathers where they were, but 
Gates denied having sexual relations with any of them, that he had 
given any of them alcohol or that he had behaved in any way improp-
erly toward them. Prior to the trial the student lawyers had filed a 
demand for a bill of particulars. In response to that demand, the pros-
ecutor allowed the students to examine the police report which con-
tained a long and somewhat vague statement allegedly taken from 
the defendant after his arrest. Since the trial was before a newly ap-
pointed judge whom we believed to be favorably disposed toward 
defendants such as ours (a gross miscalculation), we waived the right 
to a jury at the last minute and tried the case to the judge. At the trial 
the prosecutor presented the parents of two of the girls, a police officer, 
and put two of the girls on the witness stand. The girls' testimony 
about the defendant's acts was conflicting and not particularly dam-
aging but the police officer testified that Gates had told him that he 
had suggested that the girls spend the night in a specific motel in Yp-
silanti. The student lawyers conducted the direct examination of Gates 
to bring out the facts that Gates had not suggested the motel, that he 
had not had sexual relations with any of the girls and in fact that he 
had only ridden in the car with them. (On cross-examination the de-
fendant added nothing to his credibility by denying that he had made 
any statement whatsoever to the police officer.) Much to our surprise 
and chagrin, the judge convicted the defendant and from the bench 
sentenced him to 60 days in jail. That same day the student lawyers 
filed a claim of appeal and set the wheels in motion to free the defen-
dant on $250 bond. Our next step was a motion in the Circuit Court 
(to which the appeal was taken) for the production of a transcript at 
public expense. At this writing the appeal is still pending and has not 
yet been argued. 
Paternity-Henry Peterson 
The Peterson case was both the most successful and most frustrating 
effort of the summer. It was successful because it ended in a complete 
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victory for the client; it was frustrating because it did not end in a 
full-scale trial at which the student lawyer who was loaded for bear 
could have shown his stuff. Peterson had been named as the defendant 
in a paternity action started in 1968. He admitted that he had had 
sexual intercourse with the plaintiff (an ADC mother who was suing 
as a condition to keeping her ADC), but he denied that he was the 
father. He reported that various and assorted others had also slept 
with the plaintiff. Prior to our entrance into the case, the plaintiff 
had answered a series of interrogatories which had been submitted 
to her but they seemed to be of little help, and none of the many who 
had allegedly slept with her was willing to come forward. 
On the chance that they might reveal something, the student looked 
into the plaintiff's hospital records. There he found that the baby was 
probably premature and that it had probably been conceived a month 
or more after the last date on which plaintiff stated in her answers to 
the interrogatories that the defendant and she had had sexual inter-
course. The student subpoenaed the medical records and the doctor 
who attended the birth to testify at the trial. In anticipation of an 
objection to the admission of the hospital records and the doctor's 
testimony, the student did a great deal of research on exceptions to 
the doctor-patient privilege. On the second day of trial after the 
jury had been selected and both sides had announced their witnesses, 
the plaintiff failed to appear in the courtroom and the court dismissed 
the case with prejudice. The student had prepared all of the witnesses 
and would have given the opening -statement, and have conducted 
all of the direct examination. 
Consumer Credit-Merollis 
In the spring of 1969 a foreign student at the University of Mich-
igan came to the clinic to complain that he had purchased a used car 
from a Detroit dealer for $600 cash and that the car needed a com-
plete overhaul after only 40 miles of driving. He reported that he had 
taken the car to three mechanics in the 24 hours after its purchase 
and that each had reported that it needed a complete engine overhaul 
and suffered from numerous additional defects. The client also re-
ported that the dealer had refused to let him test drive the car out 
of the lot because he "did not have plates for it." The clinic com-
menced suit against the dealer on a warranty and a fraud theory and 
against General Motors on an express warranty theory based upon 
GM's advertising. The complaint sought compensatory and punitive 
damages. 
166 The University of Chicago Conference Series [No. 20: 158 
At the commencement of the summer Merollis (the dealer) moved 
for a change of venue from the 15th District (Ann Arbor) to a district 
in Wayne County (Detroit). A student prepared a memorandum and 
affidavit in answer to that motion and Merollis withdrew it without 
oral argument. Then GM moved for a summary judgment on the 
ground that no agency had been alleged and that the advertising al-
leged could not constitute an express warranty sufficient to support 
relief in this case. The same student (who had just finished her fresh-
man year) briefed and argued that motion (against an adjunct pro-
fessor who is perhaps the most able advocate in Ann Arbor). At this 
writing the case has not come to trial nor has the judge ruled on GM's 
motion. 
The five cases just described are full of lessons, lessons both for the 
critical examiner of clinical courses and for the students who partic-
ipated in the cases. In the following pages we will consider some of 
the former lessons, those about clinical courses and their educational 
value. For the moment consider a few random things which a student 
participant in some of these cases might have learned. First one gets 
a revealing look at the judicial machinery in motion in several of 
these cases. He sees that even the most "summary" of proceedings, an 
eviction, takes three months or more from beginning to end, and he 
is astounded to find that one must prepare and file at least fifteen and 
occasionally as many as twenty-one separate documents to take a non-
contested divorce from start to finish. Such a student might be stim-
ulated to ask himself why the machine could not be made to move 
faster and to operate with a lesser input of paper. 
Second these cases expose a student to a magnificent menagerie of 
documents and processes which seldom appear in person in the law 
school curriculum. These are jury instructions, questions for voir 
dire, motions, and affidavits to support such motions. If he has done 
his job correctly, the student will have considered the possible uses 
of voir dire (To get information? To give it? Both?) and as the judge 
mumbles down his list of instructions while the earnest and bewil-
dered Mrs. Jones looks up from the jury box, a thoughtful student 
might wonder whether those instructions really influence the jurors' 
behavior in the way intended. 
These cases also teach the bitter lesson that even powerful legal 
doctrine is often impotent before an intransigent judge or disingen-
uous witness. The experience of the Gates case should cause the stu-
dent to ask the utility of the Miranda doctrine in the face of almost 
certain police testimony that the Miranda warnings were given. The 
students in the Layman case surely wonder why the judge did not 
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even listen to their apparently irrefutable argument that a dismissal 
which does not specify whether it is with or without prejudice is pre-
sumed to be with prejudice and therefore to foreclose further consid-
eration of issues which could have been raised in the dismissed case. 
Finally the cases pose some knotty ethical questions: If the answer 
to a question would clearly be privileged (if the privilege were asser-
ted) may the cross-examiner nevertheless put the answer before the 
jury by the way he phrases the question? "Miss X is it true that you 
reported to your Doctor on February 17, 1968, that your last menstrual 
period had commenced on December 19, 1967?" The plaintiff's fail-
ure to appear on the second day of the Peterson case spared us our 
moment of truth on that question. Would you have asked the question 
in the form suggested? 
It is indisputable that there was much to be learned both for the 
student and for the critical observer of clinical courses in this sum-
mer's experience. Let us pass now from the examination of the un-
related tidbits of knowledge which individual students might have 
acquired to ask what generalizations, however tentative, one can draw 
from this summer's experience. 
III. SOME CONCLUSIONS ON COURSE MECHANICS 
A bothersome threshold question for one contemplating a clinical 
course is, Whom do I admit to such a course? Some assume that only 
seniors are ready for such a course; others suggest that the experience 
should come earlier in a student's law school career so that he can 
carry some of his learning back to his subsequent courses in law school. 
The ten students in the Michigan course were almost equally divided 
among those who had completed only the freshman year, those who 
had completed two years and those who were only a few credits short 
of graduation. Sad but true, I was able to discern no systematic dif-
ference among the students on the basis of their progress in law school. 
I conclude that any willing student who has completed his freshman 
year is competent to undertake a clinical law course. If one chooses 
to discriminate against any group on the basis of its progress through 
law school, that discrimination should be based upon factors other 
than their presumed competence. 
The second thing which is clear from the student experience this 
summer is that it is difficult, probably impossible, to give each student 
a uniform experience along a carefully charted path. In the first place 
cases have a way of getting settled or getting postponed so that what 
one hopes to do next week, he inevitably does next month and what 
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one plans for next month may occur next year. It is perhaps possible 
to minimize the diversity of experience by having students conduct 
discussions of their cases in seminars. We tried that with some success 
on one occasion, but I am not certain that such discussions are an effi· 
cient way of spending one's time in a clinical course. 
The third thing which is apparent from studying students' course 
evaluations and time sheets, is that the course causes some, though 
not necessarily excessive, interference with other classes. Each student 
reported that he had missed at least four classes during the summer 
because of commitments to the clinical law course; some reported 
that they had missed many more classes than that and that the course 
caused them to be unprepared for numerous additional classes. This 
was so despite the fact that most students in the course had only one 
other class (typically a class which would meet once each day five days 
a week). This experience suggests that it would be difficult to carry 
on a satisfactory clinical law program during the regular semester if 
the students had more than two courses in addition to the clinical 
course. 
Another lesson on mechanics which the course taught was the dif-
ficulty (at least for this teacher) in evaluating student performance 
in the clinical context. I offered the course on a graded or a pass-fail 
basis at the students' option. Only three out of the ten students chose 
to take it on a pass-fail basis. The problem in determining grades 
arose partly from the fact that I was unable to view the student work 
objectively after I had worked side by side with each of them for eight 
weeks and partly from the fact that the students' experience was so 
diverse that there were very few tasks which all of them performed. 
The problem was pleasantly compounded by the fact that each of the 
students was remarkably diligent and none could be identified as a 
sloth to whom a lower grade might appropriately be assigned. After 
much agony I gave each of the students in the course an "A." If I were 
to offer it again, I would require that the students take it on a pass-
fail basis. 
A final conclusion on the mechanics of the course, and a most im-
portant one, is that clinical law courses are very expensive. The law 
school budget supported the Michigan course by paying my salary 
and that of my secretary for the eight-week term. In fact I devoted 
all of my working hours to the course for the eight weeks during the 
summer and will eventually have devoted at least an additional two 
weeks of working time to the course when all of the cases . have been 
closed. The expense inherent in a 10·1 student-teacher ratio is ampli-
fied by the demands which the course makes on the teacher. The 
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course makes all of the physical and emotional demands that trial 
practice makes on a trial lawyer. I found myself worrying over cross-
examinations, over missed trial opportunities, and about improper 
rulings in quite the same way that one might worry on behalf of his 
own clients in private practice. Because of the irregularity of court 
calendars and the almost constant attention which the students on 
various cases required, I found that I was able to devote no time what-
ever to several research projects which I had in progress during the 
course. Although the cost per student could have been reduced some-
what by raising the number of students to fifteen or perhaps twenty, 
I am clear that I could not have supervised more than twenty students 
without seriously degrading the quality of the supervision. As it was, 
I was not able to supervise all of the court appearances which the stu-
dents in the course had. Make no mistake, therefore, clinical law, 
properly done, is an expensive proposition. It is expensive first because 
it requires a low student-teacher ratio and secondly because it requires 
even more of the teacher's time and energy than a traditional course 
for a comparable number of credit hours would require. 
IV. SOME THOUGHTS ON THE EDUCATIONAL VALUE AND 
APPROPRIATE GoALS OF A CLINICAL LAw CouRsE 
How best one teaches what to whom is a question much asked but 
little answered. In the context of legal education the appropriate an-
swer to that question has been a point of conflict for several centuries 
between advocates of clinical law in its various forms and advocates 
of classroom law. The following thoughts will do nothing whatever 
to resolve that conflict; they are offered only as the best guesses of a 
teacher and his students who have sampled a clinical law course. 
Before one attempts to identify things which seem to be efficiently 
teachable and some which seem not to be teachable in a clinical law 
course, it is perhaps appropriate to ask the degree of legal difficulty, 
of challenge to one's analytical ability, which inheres in legal aid cases, 
the grist for most clinical courses. I t is now gospel that the caseload 
of many legal aid societies runs heavily to divorce and is repetitive, 
dull and uninteresting. One accepting that gospel might logically 
infer that cases taken from a standard legal aid case load would not 
present legal problems worthy of a lawyer's intellectual inquiry. In 
the Michigan course we found that inference to be inaccurate and 
found rather that the cases with which we dealt in the course raised 
questions of frightening complexity and great practical difficulty. Con-
sider the following questions which were presented by cases handled 
in the course this summer: 
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1. Is it a violation of the constitutional prohibitions on imprison-
ment for debt or of the due process or equal protection clauses to 
sentence an indigent (under the court's contempt power and without 
trial) to jail for six months for failure to comply with a court order 
to support his illegitimate child? 
2. May a plaintiff in a paternity suit who has put the paternity 
question in issue by suing and who could be made to answer questions 
under oath relative to her conception, nevertheless assert the doctor-
patient privilege to prevent the introduction of evidence about the 
time of her conception and the length and weight of her child? 
3. Does the newly enacted "Michigan Tenant's Rights law" which 
authorizes a tenant to present "defenses" in an eviction action, mean 
that a lease is now to be read like a contract and that any substantial 
breach of that lease by the landlord frees the tenant from any obli-
gation under it? Does a substantial breach by the landlord go only 
to a rent reduction or does it bar eviction as well? 
4. Is a statute void for vagueness under the fourteenth amend· 
ment which makes it a crime for one to do any act which "tends to 
bring a juvenile under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court"? 
5. Is it a violation of the federal law or of the equal protection 
clause for a federally subsidized cooperative housing project to oper-
ate under a tenant admission procedure which fills its housing with 
students who are "temporarily poor" to the exclusion of the local, 
"permanent" poor? 
The cases dealt with in the course this summer raised each of the 
foregoing questions and many more which were equally thorny. Their 
solution demanded not only careful and thorough case analysis, but 
also interpretation of hastily drawn and imperfectly drafted statutes 
and a good deal of imaginative argument. Whatever the nature of 
the "average" legal aid case, our experience demonstrates that even 
the most casual selection process can cull a substantial number of 
challenging cases out of a standard clinic caseload. 
Smashing headon into difficult legal problems may be highly stim-
ulating but then so is a roller coaster ride and the question remains: 
What can one best learn and teach in a clinical setting? Consider first 
two things which our experience suggests are not well taught in a clin-
ical context. The consensus of my students and me was that the stu-
dents learned very little substantive law during the eight-week course. 
I had hoped at the commencement of the course that we might use 
the seminar format to give a rather broad instruction in landlord-
tenant law, welfare law, and certain aspects of commercial law. Apart 
from our effort in the landlord-tenant area, we had no success with 
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such projects. Of course individual students acquired a great deal of 
learning in the very narrow areas where they happened to do inten-
sive research on specific cases. Unless one drew all or nearly all of his 
cases from a single substantive area (e.g. divorce) and supplemented 
the clinical work with substantial classroom work, teaching substan-
tive law in a clinical course would be hopeless. Even if one so con-
centrated his cases and supplemented them, I am not sure that the 
clinic setting is an efficient one for teaching substantive legal princi-
ples. The cases are so diverse and the experience so unpredictable 
that. the learning is necessarily haphazard and unsystematic. 
Second I saw no evidence that the clinical experience teaches "social 
awareness." Some advocates of the clinical experience argue that the 
skin-flinted conservative can be made into a compassionate liberal by 
an eight or ten week exposure to legal aid practice. I saw nothing in 
my students nor have I seen anything in our volunteer students of 
past years which supports that thesis. It is my impression that the qual-
ity of legal work is quite unrelated to the student's political philos-
ophy, and that exposure to legal aid clients, clients who are sometimes 
dirty, occasionally illiterate and often disingenuous, is just as likely 
to reinforce a student's negative views of the poor as it is to alter those 
views. 
If it does not teach substantive law and if it does not teach social 
awareness, what then is the unique educational value of a clinical 
experience? The eight-week experience this summer suggests to me 
that the clinical experience is uniquely suited to learning and teaching 
of at least three kinds of things: 
I. Standards of professional behavior. 
2. Interviewing skill. 
3. Trial practice. 
The term "standards of professional behavior" is hopelessly am-
biguous; I use it here not to describe the fundamental values with 
which a student comes fully equipped. Only a fool would suggest that 
even the most powerful law teacher could recast a twenty year old 
liar or do much else about the fundamental values which his environ-
ment has instilled in him. Yet there are a variety of values of lesser 
magnitude, habits of performance and lawyer behavior, which stu-
dents must somehow adopt before they become full-fledged lawyers, 
and it is these to which I refer by the term standards of professional 
behavior. Some of these are the habits which we now attempt to in-
culcate in the first year: attention to detail, careful analysis, concise 
writing. It should be self-evident that one can have a greater impact 
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upon the behavior patterns of his students in the clinical setting in 
which there is one teacher and only ten students than he can in the 
classroom with one hundred students. Because there are fewer stu-
dents and because the clinical teacher is actually playing the lawyer 
role, he serves as a more intimate, realistic and therefore more power-
ful model. 
I found the students eager to understand their obligation to the 
client, to be given standards as to how much time and effort a lawyer 
owes his client. They were anxious to know how a good lawyer han-
dles the difficult but low-paying case; how a lawyer properly resolves 
the many conflicts which can arise between his current client's interest 
and his own long-range interest. (e.g. Do I represent this plaintiff in 
his charge of police brutality and so alienate all of the police in the 
county on whom I must depend for testimony in personal-injury cases? 
Do I take an appeal in this unimportant case and so make the judge 
my eternal enemy?) 
The course experience provided plentiful examples for learning 
proper lawyer behavior and its rewards. On at least four occasions 
students in the course won motions or cases because they were more 
careful, more diligent, and better prepared lawyers than their oppo-
nents were. One student's brief caused the opposing attorney to drop 
his motion for change of venue. If the opposing attorney had prepared 
as well as the student had, he would have won the motion. In another 
case a student caused a default judgment to be opened eleven months 
after it had been entered and after another lawyer had advised the 
client that the judgment could not be opened. In a third case diligent 
research uncovered a new and successful defense to a paternity suit. 
These and other experiences like them contain several lessons about 
lawyer behavior which were not lost on the students. As one student 
put it in his course evaluation: "Exposure to the rewards of . .. con-
scientious preparation is surely not premature." 
Not only did the cases serve to inculcate the value of preparation, 
they also displayed the necessity for deviating from the local practice 
norms when that deviation was in the client's interest. In several of 
the cases which the students won they submitted memoranda of law 
in circumstances in which local practitioners would not have done 
so; in other cases they asked for things to which they were entitled 
(e.g. a jury trial in a traffic case, a bill of particulars in a misdemeanor 
case) which were not commonly requested in the community. More-
over I attempted to reinforce these lessons by pointing to the perfor-
mance of some of the most able members of the bar in Ann Arbor 
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and by inviting one such member to participate in a seminar discus-
sion. I hope and believe that most of the ten students in the course 
have carried away some clear ideas about acceptable standards of law-
yer performance-of the way pleadings should look, of the kind of 
preparation one should undertake for trial, and above all about the 
necessity of "rocking the boat" when such behavior is appropriate to 
protect a client's interests. 
A second and quite different thing which can be taught in the clinic 
study is the skill of interviewing. No one will deny that we do a largely 
ineffective job of teaching interviewing in the traditional law school 
curriculum; mostly we ignore the problem. Its quantity and variety 
in domestic relations cases make the legal aid clinic a fertile place for 
interviewing training. We devoted only a small part of the Michigan 
course to interviewing; that work consisted of I) my observation of 
one or more interviews by each student, 2) a discussion with the stu-
dent of his interview after it had taken place, and 3) a seminar on 
interviewing conducted by a psychiatrist and myself. 
The interviews which I observed presented a rich and taxing set 
of problems for the student-interviewer. In at least half of them the 
client was in tears at some point during the interview; most of the 
interviews required the student to ask about intimate, financial or 
sexual details of the clients' lives. After each interview we would dis-
cuss the client's case (Does she really want the legal consequence for 
which she asked? Why didn't you ask her whether she had had sexual 
intercourse with her husband after the fight which she described?). 
Although this experience was even more of the blind leading the blind 
than usual, my impression is that the students became more sensitive 
to the job they were to accomplish in the interview and more skillful 
in drawing out the client and putting the client at ease. It would be 
an easy matter to devote an entire clinical law course to the system-
atic teaching of interviewing. 
Trial practice is a final skill which can be readily taught in the clinic 
setting. When our course is completed, students will have conducted 
at least five jury and four non-jury trials, more than fifteen noncon-
tested divorces and will have argued at least six contested motions. 
Each of the students will have examined a witness in an uncontested 
matter and more than half of the students will have examined wit-
nesses in contested matters before juries. More than anything else, the 
summer course turned out to be a course in trial practice. The cases 
with which we dealt exhibited all the pesky problems about which 
one would talk in a trial practice course: the importance of facts re-
174 The University of Chicago Conference Series [No. 20: 158 
search, the drafting of pleadings, interrogatories and motions, the 
selection of a jury, the art of examining and cross-examining witnesses, 
of making opening statements and closing arguments and many other 
problems of trial tactics. 
If one were to hold out a clinical course as a full-scale trial practice 
course, he would have to overcome the inevitable scheduling problems 
which arise because of the settlement or adjournment of cases. And 
he would have to schedule at least some classroom work to insure that 
the students, whose trials would vary, had some exposure to problems 
which did not arise in their own trials. These problems of scheduling 
and of the diversity of student experience would be a small cost to 
pay for the stimulation inherent in doing real work on real cases. 
One can identify a variety of other intangible educational benefits 
to be derived from a clinical course. Several of my students stated that 
two years of law school had dampened their initial desire to become 
lawyers but that the course experience of handling cases on behalf 
of real people had revitalized their interest in becoming lawyers. Surely 
too there are intangible benefits to be derived by the teacher. I am 
certain that I learned more this summer than any student did and I 
enjoyed the course at least as much as any of the students. (Although 
I did not volunteer this information to my students, one member of 
the class and I were jointly conducting the first jury trial for each of 
us one day this June.) 
Students in the course, and other students vicariously, may derive 
benefits in their traditional law school courses from the clinical expe-
rience. On several occasions students who were taking evidence con-
currently with the course were delighted to find that the principles 
which they had learned only a few days previously in evidence class 
were actually applied in trials. Another student who had just finished 
his freshman year commented with obvious amazement that much of 
·what he had learned in civil procedure was relevant and indeed nec-
essary for a lawyer to know. Surely a student who has handled a bank-
ruptcy, bargained with a creditor and represented a tenant in an evic-
tion suit, will better understand traditional courses in creditors' rights, 
commercial transactions and landlord-tenant law and will have better 
and more incisive questions to ask. Indeed one of my colleagues who 
teaches family law has reported to me that legal aid students ask much 
more relevant questions and stand for less chaff than the ordinary stu-
dent. Still it is unclear to me whether this value, this enriching of tra-
ditional courses by contribution of clinical experience, is a marginal 
one which occurs only infrequently or whether it is a phenomenon 
experienced by each student who has had a clinical exposure. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
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I t appears that clinical law, and especially clinical law practiced on 
behalf of the poor, will occupy the position in the law school universe 
of the seventies which was held by international and comparative law 
in the sixties and late fifties. It promises to be the darling not only of 
our students but also of the foundations and the federal government 
and the latter two will doubtless entice all of us into a mindless and 
unbecoming scramble to spend their money. (A colleague of mine once 
opined that a law school would accept and operate a "skunk farm" 
if there were any money in it.) It will be hard utterly to waste that 
money, for even the most ill-conceived clinical program is worth some-
thing, but it will take more careful planning and more thoughtful and 
deeper analysis than anyone has yet offered to insure that such money 
is spent in an efficien t and effective way. Notwithstanding the questions 
and doubts expressed above, I remain a wholly partial and largely ir-
rational advocate of clinical law and offer the course description on the 
foregoing pages principally as a datum for the analysis of observers 
more objective than I. 
